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Production subsidies have not been used by International Business literature to explain firms 
internationalization processes. We argue subsides may have a role to play in that process. Using a 
longitudinal database (1996-2003) at the plant level, this paper aims to shed light on the causal nexus 
between production-related subsidies and exports, in Portugal. We implement a propensity score matching 
approach in order to evaluate the effects of subsidies on both the probability of domestic firms to begin 
exporting and on the probability of increasing the export share of already exporters. We find no impact of 
subsidies on the ability of domestic firms to become exporters; additionally, no effects of subsidies are 
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Exports are decisive for countries´ economic growth, especially in downturn cycles when domestic aggregate 
demand is weak, however, firms, in order to start exporting or to export more, must overcome several 
difficulties and costs. So, most governments, to promote exports, apply various specific export promotion 
policies and generic production subsidies, even if direct export subsidization is forbidden by World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules.  
 
At the firm level, the internationalization of Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) has been explained, in 
International Business (IB) literature, by various models and theories; however, given the complexity of such a 
process, the comprehension of internationalization, requires the understanding of factors that make it happen 
or at least that make it possible which leads to an integrative model of internationalization as proposed by 
Etemad and Wright (1999). Such models assume foreign market knowledge as the key factor to enhance 
SME internationalization and in such a scenario subsidies could prove to be very useful as they can enhance 
market, network, cultural and entrepreneurial knowledge.  
 
However, there are few empirical proofs that governmental (exporting) promotional policies are, indeed, 
effective in removing or at least in reducing the difficulties of exports. This lack of evidence may result from the 
fact that there are diverse institutional arrangements (both formal and informal, both direct and indirect, 
designed to help reducing such sunk costs of exporting) deriving complex the task of distinguish the 
mechanisms which are effective in promoting exports and which are not; moreover, such complexity and the 
very nature of the supporting mechanisms may open path to misuses, to abuses (e.g., Nogués, 1989) and 
even for a practical impossibility of controlling firms´ subsidies. Another important factor to consider is the 
scarcity of complete data, at the firm level, on public subsidies designed to help exporting, turning such test 
even more difficult.  
 
Additionally, there is a methodological difficulty to the referred test given that it is impossible to observe the 
same firms with and without such subsidies and supports; in fact, only indirectly the impact of public support to 
exports has been analyzed. All these facts increase the doubt on this subject: are the public policies of export 
promotion ineffective or are we methodologically unprepared? 
 
In line with some few and recent papers which investigate the connections between production-subsidies and 
exports, we use a large firm level dataset and matching procedures (e.g., Gorg et al., 2008 for Irish firms or 
Girma et al., 2009a for German firms) in order to assess the importance of subsidies to exporting activities. 
The main motivation of this paper is to present significant evidence of the links between production related 
subsidies granted to Portuguese firms and their export performance. In order to do it, we use the most 
representative panel data for manufacturing firms in Portugal, for the period 1996-2003, and apply a 
propensity score matching approach to reveal the causality nexus from subsidies to exports. 
 
This paper adds a contribution to a relatively new and limited branch of international management literature 
which studies the relationships between subsidies and exports; although Portugal is not a major partner in 
international trade, the long tradition of Portuguese governments in supporting firms with production subsidies 
gives to our analysis a special importance.  
 
In line with previous studies (Gorg et al, 2008; Girma et al. 2009.a) for other countries, we notice that 
production subsidies have, in general terms, no impact on the probability of domestic firms to begin exporting; GEE 
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moreover, even a counterproductive effect is noticed one year after grants are received suggesting their 
misuse. Regarding exporting firms, we found no effects of subsidies on exports; previous studies had only 
found weak effects mainly concentrated in highly subsidized and intensive capital firms.  
 
At another level we have also studied the role production-subsidies may have in the economic performance of 
firms; in general, subsidies seem to generate positive effects on the efficiency and sales of firms already 
exporters and fewer effects on domestic firms, thus explaining the idea of the incapacity of subsidies to 
promote new exporters as they do not improve their efficiency required for foreign markets. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief summary on the main related 
literature. Section 3 describes the data used for this study. Section 4 presents some evidence on subsidies 
and exports in Portuguese firms. In Section 5 we present the main econometric results obtained for the 
analysis of subsidies´ impact on exports. Section 6 analyzes subsidies´ impact on firms´ general performances 
and Section 7 concludes.    
 
2. Literature on SME internationalization and the role of subsidies  
The International Management (IM) literature assumed through times different perspectives in what concerns 
firms internationalization. Over the past five decades, scholars have presented various descriptive models of 
export behavior and export performance and hundreds of different variables have been advanced in the 
literature as determinants of export performance. Whatever is the perspective or model used, we argue that 
subsidies could be one of such important variables: we present three examples.  
 
One of the most used approaches of IM literature towards internationalization was the Resource –Based-View 
of the firm (Barney, 1991 or Wernerfelt, 1984) which focuses on how sustained competitive advantage is 
generated by the unique bundle of resources at the center of the firm (e.g., Conner and Prahalad 1996);  
subsidies received by firms could be one of such resources. Moreover, this approach assuming firms are sets 
of assets focuses on internal characteristics such as capital, knowledge or workforce; in this perspective 
subsidies could also help firms to obtain such inputs more easily and then help firms to export
1. 
 
At another perspective, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) stated that it is the liability of “outsidership” rather than 
the liability of “foreignness” that gives rise to internationalization difficulties. They use “outsidership” to mean 
that the firm is not a member of relevant networks and that internationalization can be seen as a way to 
become an insider in relevant networks in the focal foreign market. Those authors see internationalization as a 
by-product of efforts to establish or improve on a position in a foreign network; in this line, subsidies could be a 
support to such strategy by providing that firms with the resources necessary to hire specialized workforce 
able to perform network efforts with success. 
 
Nevertheless, given the complexity of internationalization processes, the need for a new perspective in 
explaining firm internationalization has arisen in recent years. In fact, each previous perspective proposed so 
far only explained partly the phenomenon but internationalization is a complex phenomenon. Such complexity 
involves the decision maker, the network´s role, the firm characteristics, the culture and environment 
surrounding firms and much more factors. Therefore, to understand internationalization, it is necessary to 
understand the factors that make it happen and the factors that hamper it. This leads to the internationalization 
integrative models (e.g., Prashantham 2005) in which the importance of foreign market knowledge has been 
                                                 
1 Even if some authors (e.g., Tecce et al. 1997) argue that such resources must be built inside the firm and not 
bought outside it. GEE 
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stressed along several channels: market knowledge, network knowledge, cultural knowledge and 
entrepreneurial knowledge; moreover, in such models the importance of foreign market knowledge is mixed 
with the absorptive capacity of firms in learning about foreign markets. In fact, organizational learning has 
always been viewed as being a decisive factor of the entrepreneurial process (e.g., Lumpkin and Lichtenstein 
2005).   
 
Although not explicitly analyzed in IM literature, production subsidies could help firms reducing their 
handicaps, thus contributing to a higher ability to face internationalization; in fact, subsidies granted: (i) to 
create new specific jobs fulfilled with experts in market knowledge or cultural knowledge, (ii) to help supporting 
specific production costs, (iii) to help supporting some costs for imported materials and bought for future 
exported products of higher quality or (iv) even to pay for some employees´ training, they may all contribute to 
improve firms´ absorptive capacity and their ability to overcome foreign market entry costs. In such a way, 
subsidies could enhance domestic firms to internationalize and exporters to develop their performances.  
 
Moreover, in international economics literature, some heterogeneous firms´ trade models (e.g., Melitz, 2003) 
suggest that export subsidies can indeed increase productivity by inducing a reallocation of labor from less to 
more productive ﬁrms, even if an exclusive focus on productivity can be counterproductive and a broader 
analysis is necessary. In fact, export subsidies may present also some dangers namely when they are 
misused by managers or when their grant relies on subjective mechanisms based on arbitrary decisions, case 
in which the competition among firms in order to obtain them may generate negative impacts
2.  
 
Despite the importance of public policies to promote exporting activities, there are, however, few empirical 
studies that have investigated this issue. A first wave of such empirical studies relied on industry level–data
3 
and only recently firm-level data begun to be used for such analysis. In 2000, Alvarez and Crespi studied the 
activity of the Chilean export promotion agency with direct firm-level sample data and found a positive effect of 
such public policies on firms´ exports (both in the extensive margins and in intensive margin). Bernard and 
Jensen (2004) studied the determinants of exporting activity in the US, investigating amongst other things, 
whether export promotion expenditures at the state level influenced the decision of US plants to export or not; 
their findings suggest little evidence that such policies are able to encourage participation of US domestic 
manufacturers in the global market. By contrast, Martincus and Carballo (2008) and Helmers and Trofimenko 
(2009) still using exports subsidies, find some positive effects on export performances of such subsidies, using 
firm level data for Peru and Colombia, respectively.  
 
Not disposing of direct data on export promotion subsidies, other studies opt to analyze the effects of overall 
production-related subsidies on firms´ export performance. Gorg et al. (2008) found, for Irish firms that 
production subsidies were not capable to motivate domestic firms to become exporters; nevertheless, they 
found subsidies, with a minimum level, being able to enhance the performance of already exporters. Girma et 
al. (2009b) had found similar results for Chinese as they noticed production subsidies stimulate exports of 
already exporting capital intensive firms. In 2009, applying a matching approach to investigate the causal 
effect of production subsidies on export activities, Girma et al. (2009a) also found no impact of subsidies on 
the probability a domestic firms to start exporting but they also found weak evidence for a positive impact of 
subsidies on the growth of the share of exports in total sales, in West Germany but no evidence in East 
Germany. 
                                                 
2 See Mitra (2000) for an example of this situation. 
3 See Helmers and Trofimenko (2009) for a review of such literature. GEE 
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3. Data  
In Portugal, production-subsidies are financial assistance that firms receive from government, local authorities 
or from European Union aiming to lower firms´ production costs and the prices of produced goods or even to 
provide a proper payment for factors of production. In accounting terms, Government grants are assistance by 
government in the form of transfer resources to a firm, in return for past, present or future compliance of 
certain conditions related to the operational activities of the company. It is important to remark that these 
production subsidies are not specifically created to promote exports.  
 
Our data source is the Portuguese National Statistics Institute (INE) balance sheet information (IAE). IAE 
provides information of firms’ balance sheets,
4 and uses a survey sample
5 of all manufacturing Portuguese 
firms, from 1996-2003. We used as variables: number of employees, turnover, production-subsidies, imports, 
exports, number of employees specifically devoted to R&D activities, share of foreign capital, capital, labour 
costs and earnings. Firms are classified according to their main activity, as identified by INE standard codes 
(CAE), which are correlated with Eurostat Nace 1.1 taxonomy. Despite being unbalanced, our database 
contains information for an average of 4,500 firms per year. Capital is proxied by tangible fixed assets at book 
value (net of depreciation). All nominal variables are measured in 1996 Euros and are deflated using 2 digit 
industry-level price indices provided by INE; for capital stock we use the same deflator for all sectors. 
 
Given that we were interested in a firm-level productivity measure and since it is highly probable that profit-
maximizing firms immediately adjust their input levels, each time they notice productivity shocks, productivity 
and input choices are likely to be correlated and thus Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimation involves 
problems. Thus, in line with several authors (e.g., Maggioni, 2009), TFP is estimated using the semi-
parametric method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This method recognizes the simultaneity bias as firms 
observe the productivity shocks but econometricians do not. Thus, we compute TFP as the residual of a 
Cobb-Douglas production function in which: the firm value added is the independent variable; capital, labour 
and unobservable productivity level are the dependent ones. Besides, this method assumes that intermediate 
inputs present a monotonic positive relationship with productivity and thus could be used as proxies for TFP. 
Given data availability, we use intermediate inputs as the deflated values of “supplies and services consumed 
from thirds” at book value. We estimate production function for every 2-digit sector separately. 
 
4. Evidences on exports and subsidies  
Table 1 shows that, in the period 1996-2003, 26% of Portuguese firms received production-related subsidies, 
at least for one year. Of the firms receiving subsidies 80% were already exporters and only 20% non-
exporters; this fact suggests that subsidized firms are already in a superior path. The status of subsidized firm 
is highly stable; in fact, subsidies´ support was highly persistent as 31% of all subsidized firms reported to 
have obtained operating subsidies in each and every year of the study and more than half of firms had 





                                                 
4 Since 2004, INE has changed its methodology and works with the universe of Portuguese manufacturing firms but before 
2004 the only data available is the one we use.  
5 Our database includes all manufacturing firms with more than 100 workers and a representative sample of the  
 GEE 
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Table 1 – Production-Subsidies in Portuguese firms (1996-2003) 
Firms with subsidies  Firms without subsidies  Total of firms observed 
 
2,831 (26%)  7,922 (74%)  10,753 (100%) 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 2 – Subsidies persistency in Portuguese firms (1996-2003) 
Number of years 
with subsidy 
8 7 6 5 4 3  2  1 
% of firms 
subsidized 
 
31%  9% 9% 10%  10%  12% 9%  10% 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Subsidies represented, on average for that period, 1,4% of sales for subsidized firms but there was a 
considerable time heterogeneity as reflected in Table 3. A sectoral heterogeneity was also observed as firms 
belonging to sectors like: food and beverage, furniture and recycling sectors obtained the higher values of 
subsidies per sales and in most cases the higher values of subsidies per employees (Appendix A).  
 
Table 3 – Subsidies by year and employee 





1,8% 1,8%  1,4% 1,3% 1,1%  2,2%  0,9%  0,8% 
Subsidy by 
employee (€) 
232 243  280 258 291  178  185  189 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Subsidies, for subsidized firms, are much concentrated. For Portuguese firms, international trade and 
subsidies are much more concentrated than employment or sales, as measured by the Theil index for 
inequality assessment (Table 4). 
 








    Source: Own calculations 
 
Subsidies and exports are positively related as observed in Table 5. We use as dependent variables in column 
(1) and line (1) a dummy for exporter status in each year and in column (1 ) and line (2) a variable for export 
shares in total sales; each of those variables are regressed on a constant, a dummy for subsidized firms, GEE 
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sectoral codes and size. In column (2) similar regressions are performed but firm fixed effects are added. We 
perform regressions using logit models for export status dummy and fractional logit models for export shares
6.  
All regression coefficients are positive and statistically significant, even when controlling for firm fixed effects 
and sectoral and time effects. These positive coefficients mean that subsidized firms, when compared with 
non-subsidized firms, are more probably exporters (first line of regressions) and among exporters subsidized 
firms present a higher share of exports relative to total sales (second line of regressions). The consistency of 
such coefficients is confirmed by the fact that, although not reported, such correlation is observable for each 
and every year between 1996 and 2003. However, those positive coefficients do not mean the existence of 
any causality relationship between subsidies and exports.  
 




Subsidized firms (dummy) 
Independent variable: Subsidized firms 
(dummy) (firms fixed effects) 













Source: Own calculations. 
5. Evaluating the effects of subsidies on exports 
In order to investigate the causal effects of production-related subsidies on the probability to export and on 
export shares of total sales, we must use a different methodology, beyond regression analysis. In fact, the 
alleged positive relationship may be the result of both causality directions: (i) on one hand, a production-
subsidy may help firms to support fixed costs related with the beginning of exporting activities or to deal with 
particular markets´ difficulties; moreover, subsidies have the ability of reducing some variable costs of already 
exporters thus inducing an increase in export shares in total sales; (ii) at the other hand, new exporting firms 
or firms reaching to export to particular destinations may gain the right to collect some subsidies that 
governments use to reward such performances. Thus, the causality may run in both directions; not to mention 
the fact that there may exist other firms´ characteristics beyond subsidies and exports that can influence 
simultaneously both: Girma et al. (2009a) mention as a clear example of such variables the influence of R&D 
activities on this issue. 
 
Other important fact to remember when dealing with such methodological issues is that subsidies are not 
granted to firms at random but instead their allocation is (or should be) the result of a conscious selection from 
governments. In fact, we can admit two opposite selection methods: (i) one relies on the fact that subsidies 
are granted conditional on the observation of some criteria
7 that firms must fill, like: certain products exported, 
certain types of workforce employed, certain markets achieved, certain types of firms or sales from certain 
regions of the country; (ii) the other selection method relies on the possibility of subsidies to be granted on the 
basis of firms´ connectedness and proximity with Government or public officials and related members. 
Although opposites both introduce a selection criteria on subsidized firms thus requiring other methods than 
simple regression analysis in order to properly evaluate the effects of subsidies on firms´ performances. 
 
                                                 
6 We use fractional logit models given the fact that the share of exports in total sales is a percentage variable with a high 
probability at zero due to the large share of firms with no exports. See Papke and Wooldrige (1996) 
7 Sometimes the complexity or opacity of those criteria can create situations of negative effects of subsidies on firms´ 
performances given the fact that some of them feel discouraged from applying for subsides (see Helmers and Trofimenko, 
2009, for further discussion). GEE 
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Thus, by assuming subsidies (whatever form they have) are not randomly granted to firms means one cannot 
assess their effects simply by a simple comparison between subsidized and non-subsidized firms. In line with 
Girma et al. (2009a), we argue that this situation closely claims for the use of matching methods. In fact, the 
ideal method for evaluating subsidies´ effects would be to compare two situations for the same firm: (i) its 
performances in some year – e.g., exports in that year – in the case it had received a public subsidy with, (ii) 
the performance on the same moment had it not received such support, which would be the counterfactual 
situation. Given that the information about the counterfactual will never be available, several authors (in line 
with Heckman et al. 1998) argue that an adequate way to obtain an appropriate evaluation on the effects of 
the subsidies is to build a “control group” of firms that did not receive subsidies in that year but were as similar 
as possible with those firms receiving subsidies in that moment (the treated ones or starters).  
 
By using matching techniques, we hope to build consistent counterfactuals to every subsidy “starter”, while 
using a generic non-subsidized firm as the comparison group would not allow us to make causal inferences, 
since the observed differences after subsidies begin could exist previously in a pre-subsidy period and remain 
after it. Assuming the possibility of building such group of control firms, then we would match every treated 
firm with one or several control firms (the most similar to the first) and therefore we would assume that 
differences between their performances, in the future, to be the result of such treatment (subsidy) which one 
firm received (the treated) and the other (control) did not.  
 
We are interested in two complementary analyzes: at one hand, we want to evaluate the impact of subsidies 
on the probability of non-exporting firms to begin exporting; at the other hand, we are interested in evaluating 
the effects of subsidies on the exporting performance of firms already exporters. 
 
In order to apply such methodology to the study of the causal effect of subsidies on starting to export, we 
consider as the treated group of firms, for every year from 1998 to 2002, the firms which, in each year, fill the 
following cumulative conditions: (i) without subsidies two years before, (ii) without subsidies in the year before, 
(ii) with subsidies in the year considered, (iv) never exported until that year. The control group for each year is 
made by the firms which had not subsidies in the whole period 1996-2002 and which did not export until the 
analyzed year. Appendix B presents the number of treated and control firms that were used. 
 
At the other hand, in order to study the causal effect of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales, we 
consider as treated group of firms, for every year from 1998 to 2002, the firms which, in each year, fill the 
following cumulative conditions: (i) without subsidies two years before, (ii) without subsidies in the year before, 
(ii) with subsidies in the year considered, (iv) with exports in the previous year. The control group is made by 
the firms which have not subsidies in the whole period 1996-2002 and which exported in the previous year. 
Appendix C presents the number of treated and control firms that were used for this test. 
 
In order to apply matching procedures we must start by estimating the propensity score. This particular 
propensity score is performed using a probit regression of a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is subsidized 
(treated) in that year and 0 otherwise. Such dummy is, as a base model, regressed on several variables 
lagged one year
8; these variables are assumed to be relevant
9 in the selection of firms to be subsidized: 
number of employees, total factor productivity, wages, a dummy for the existence of R&D workforce, a foreign 
capital dummy, earnings, sales, two digit sectoral dummies. To free up the functional form of the propensity 
                                                 
8 In order to respect the Conditional Independence Assumption. 
9 Given that we are using general production subsidies and not specific ones we opt to consider as determinants for subsidy 
selection common variables mostly used on the previous empirical works on this subject (e.g., Girma et al., 2009 or Gorg et 
al. 2008). GEE 
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score we also included higher order polynomials and interaction terms. Nevertheless, in the search of the 
higher quality match, different specifications were used for different years and that option revealed to be more 
adequate than using only a single specification for all time cohorts of treated and control firms. 
 
When performing these estimations in each year, we observed the importance of the different covariates for 
the dependent variables; although with some heterogeneity, we noticed some regularities as firms´ sector, 
previous importer status and foreign capital share were most frequently important factors in explaining firms´ 
probability of receiving subsidies (Appendix D). Otherwise, the efficiency level, the presence of R&D within the 
firm and wages were not significant in explaining the probability of a firm to receive a subsidy.  
 
After propensity scores are obtained, several algorithms could be used to establish the match between treated 
and control firms. We tested, with similar results, the use of two of those weighting schemes: kernel matching 




In order to evaluate the matching quality we implemented a balancing test proposed by Becker and Ichino 
(2002) and a standard T-test for equality of means. The quality of the matching is confirmed as in Appendixes 
D and E it is evident the high percentage reduction in bias between treated and controls achieved after the 
matching, thus ensuring we choose the right specification for propensity score. We also ensure the common 
support condition which means that we drop subsidy starters which presented in each year a propensity score 
higher (lower) than the maximum (minimum) score of non-subsidized firms.  
 
Given that our purpose is to evaluate the effects of subsidies on the probability of a domestic firms of start 
exporting and on the export share of total sales of already exporters, we compute
11 the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) as follows: (i) for the first case, we are interested in the differences between the 
percentage of export starters (the outcome variable) among the subsidized firms (treated) and the same 
percentage for non treated firms; (ii) for the second case, ATT means the difference in the change of the 
export share of total sales (the outcome in question) between the treated firms (new subsidized in each year) 
and the same outcome for matched non treated firms (firms that remain non-subsidized in that year). We 
assess ATT both for the year in analysis (year t) and for the next three years.  When performing that second 
ATT we are controlling for unobservable, time-invariant differences between treated and untreated firms, thus, 
in practice we implement a difference-in-differences matching estimator, as suggested by Blundell and Costa 
Dias (2000) and Heckman et al. (1998). So, we compare the change in exports´ performance between the 
group of new subsidized and the most similar group of non-subsidized firms. Results for the pooled sample of 
all years´ causal effects of subsidies on starting to export are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 - Causal effects of subsidies on starting to export, 1998-2002 
 ATT  (prob.exp  t) ATT  (prob.exp  t+1) ATT  (prob.exp  t+2) ATT  (prob.exp  t+3) 












Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are significant at 1%.
**: 
mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not significant.  
 
                                                 
10 We use a bandwith of 0,001. Moreover, the results show little sensivity on the weighting regime used or on the bandwith 
interval. 
11 We use psmatch2 command (version 3.0) for Stata 10.1 GEE 
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We find no evidence of subsidies to enhance internationalization of domestic firms; on the contrary, there is 
some evidence suggesting that subsidies imply a decrease in exports probability of firms, especially one year 
after the subsidy is received. Although not reported, we have also tested similar effects for each of the single 
years of the sample but the no effects are noticed. These poor effects of subsidies could be the result of the 
fact that they are not designed specifically to enhance exports; moreover, the possible positive effects on 
employment or sales may be insufficient to spread to other variable, thus impeding firms´ internationalization.  
 
Results for the causal effects of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales are reported in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 - Causal effects of subsidies on export shares, 1998-2002 
 
 















Source: Own calculations.  
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are significant at 1%.
**: 
mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not significant 
 
There is no evidence, that subsidies cause any increase in exports´ share of total sales. This absence of 
effects occurs both for the year subsidies start and for the following three years. Moreover a non-reported 
analysis for each individual year of the sample shows that no effect is detected. 
 
In a complementary analysis and given that subsidies present a considerable heterogeneity in what respects: 
values per employee, average levels by year (Table 3) and average level by industrial sector (Appendix A), we 
argue that it would be of considerable interest to perform an analysis of subsidies´ effects using not a binary 
treatment approach as we do, but instead a continuous treatment approach, varying between zero and a 
certain maximum amount. However, the use of a generalized propensity score is hampered by the highly 
skewed distribution of subsidies per employee and even by the dominant share of non-subsidized  
 
Nevertheless, in order to study the impact of subsidy level on the causality nexus for the probability of 
exporting and for the export share in total sales, we repeated all previous tests but with one difference: we add 
an additional condition to treated firms – treated firms have to receive, in each year, a subsidy per employee 
higher than the double of each year´s average subsidy per employee – in order to evaluate only highly 
subsidized firms and not all subsidized firms. This computation meant a reduction in the number of “treated 
firms” by an average of 40% given the initial number. The results of such causality effects of high subsidies on 
the usual two dependent variables are expressed in Table 8 but no kind of effects are detected.  
 
Table 8 - Causal effects of high subsidies p.e. , 1998-2002 
 
 



























Source: Own calculations 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are significant at 1%.
**: 
mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not significant 
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Additionally, in order to take advantage of a sectoral analysis for the whole period 1998-2002, we performed a 
separate ATT for each of the 23 two-digit industry sectors available. In what concerns the probability of 
starting to export for domestic firms, the very limited number of observations for some sectors did not allow us 
to perform that analysis to all sectors
12; nevertheless, we noticed that the probability of domestic firms to 
become exporters was only confirmed for the group of sectors related with the machinery cluster, involving all 
types of machines (electrical type, office type, motor vehicles and general machinery). Inversely, for food and 
beverage sector the subsidies reduced the probability of domestic firms to become exporters. For all other 
sectors no evidence of any kind of effects was noticed.  
 
Regarding the change in export shares of already exporters, the number of observations available allowed us 
to perform ATT computations for the majority of two digit industrial sectors. Results in Appendix E show that 
on one hand, there are positive effects of subsidies in export shares for basic metals, general machinery and 
electrical machinery; at the other hand, some sectors testify negative effects of subsidies on export share of 
total sales: food and beverages, textiles, pulp and paper, fabricated metal products. However, given the 
limitations of the dimension of our sample for most groups, additional precaution is needed in what concerns 
general conclusions.     
 
We have also performed two more complementary tests: (i) in the first, we divided firms based on initial TFP 
level and we observed
13 that for firms with higher TFP levels, subsidies generated a positive impact on export 
shares, while for other firms there was no visible effect; we argue that subsidies have higher ability to generate 
positive impacts on exports when firms possess a superior absorptive ability; (ii) in the second test, evaluating 
the effects of subsidies, conditional on initial earnings level (Table 9) suggests that grants generate negative 
effects on the probability of exporting of firms with positive earnings, while in firms with negative earnings no 
visible positive effects are detected.  
 
Table 9 - Causal effects of subsidies on the probability of exporting, 1998-2002 
 
 
ATT (prob.exp t) ATT  (prob.exp  t+1) 














Source: Own calculations 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are 
significant at 1%.
**: mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not significant 
6. Assessing the effects of subsidies in general firms´ performances 
Given that production subsidies observed in our database are not specifically oriented to export enhancing but 
aim, in general , to promote employment, to support specific industries eventually in specific region and to help 
specific firms in difficulties, we admit it would be of most interest to analyze their impact on general firm 
performances.  
 
According to Community European Treaty, state aids to firms have in common the fact that they are granted 
by a member State or through State resources and they favour certain undertakings or the production of 
                                                 
12 Given the small number of observations we decided not to present the results in the form of table 
13 These results are not reported. GEE 
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certain goods, but they may also distort or threaten to distort competition, affecting trade between member 
States. Thus, state interventions could be necessary in order to reach a better allocation of resources but 
simultaneously they may harm the competition environment, with negative consequences. In this framework 
the consequences of subsidies to firms could be either positive or negative and previous studies are not 
sufficiently decisive to support a clear statement on what´s to be expected on this issue: Bergström (2000), 
Tzelepis and Skuras (2004) found that subsidized investments under the regional development frameworks 
(structural fund programs) were ineffective. 
 
Gadd et al. (2009) present a summary on previous research on this subject: on one hand, some positive 
effects on employment and on the dynamics of turnover and employment are reported for subsidized firms; at 
the other hand, negative effects on productivity growth rates are also observed in subsidized firms. The very 
study of Gaad et al. (2009) for Swedish firms, using a propensity score matching approach, concluded that 
subsidies enhanced employment growth levels of subsidized firms but there was no positive effect on firms´ 
productivity.  
 
Using our database for Portuguese manufacturing firms we performed other ATT computations for the 
subsidies effects on several other variables: wages, sales, employment, total factor productivity and imports. 
Table 10 present subsidies´ effects on domestic firms and Table 11 presents the same effects but on already 
exporters. 
 
The general conclusion is that subsidies generate more positive effects on firms already exporters and fewer 
effects on domestic firms; such positive effects are observed in exporters´ employment, sales and TFP. For 
domestic firms, subsidies seem to decrease wages and to increase firms´ ability to import. Moreover for both 
group of firms, subsidies seem to reduce firms´ earnings some years after subsidies are granted
14. 
 
We argue that, for domestic firms some subsidies could be directed to partially support costs of some 
imported materials; such effects are observed, one year after subsidies´ granting. However, in spite of such 
positive effect it does not produce any impact on those firms´ exporting abilities. At another level, subsidies 
generate wage decreasing in the same domestic firms. Overall, for these firms the impact of subsidies is 
restricted to employment and imports but does not impact efficiency and profitability, by the contrary it seems 
to reduce earnings some years after. 
 
Table 10 - Effects of subsidies, pooled 1998-2002, for domestic firms 

















































































Source: Own calculations 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are significant at 1%.
**: 
mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not significant 
                                                 
14 Given data limitations we could not test this hypothesis any further; anyway, we can argue that subsidies harm firms´ 
profits three years after being received what could be derived from the subsidies´ persistency creating in some firms 
negative behaviors conducing to less efficiency.  GEE 
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Overall, effects (both positive and negative) seem to be more robust for domestic firms than for already 
exporters. Moreover, such superior strength of subsidies´ effects also seems to perform more clearly in the 
following year after subsidy reception than in the same year it occurs. 
 



























































































Source: Own calculations 
Notes: We report bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). If nothing mentioned coefficients are significant at 1%.
**: 
mean significant at least at 5%. 
* means coefficients are significant at least at 10%. 
+ means coefficients are not significant 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
International Business and Management literature has not yet studied the role of production subsidies to firms´ 
ability to export; however, whatever model or approach we use, subsidies may perform a role in facilitating 
internationalization; in fact, given that internationalization success requires foreign market knowledge and its 
absorption and appropriation by firms, subsidies could facilitate the internationalization process. This paper 
investigates, for the first time for Portuguese firms, the links between general production-subsidies and 
exports. Although being positively related those variables´ connections may suffer from endogeneity and 
sample selection. Thus, in order to really uncover their relationship we apply a propensity score matching 
approach to reveal the causal effects of subsidies on exports.  
 
Contrary to our best expectations, we found that in Portuguese firms, production subsidies had neither visible 
impacts on the probability of a domestic firm to become exporter, nor positive impacts on the export intensity 
of already exporters. Nevertheless, in a more disaggregated analysis we noticed that subsidies had positive 
effects on the probability of domestic firms to become exporters, only for the group of firms related with the 
machinery cluster, thus involving all types of producer of machines (electrical type, office type, motor vehicles 
and general machinery). We argue that such disparities rely on the fact that as production subsidies are not 
tailored to export enhancement they only generate positive effects when other requirements are achieved. In 
fact, even when firms have decided to internationalize they may still be vulnerable to several constraints in 
their process; in this line to know the main barriers firms face is an important contribution to the explanation of 
the previous results. More probably, subsidies were wrongly designed or were badly conducted by firms 
impeding better results; the persistency of subsidies in the same firms may be a clue in such facts. 
 
When analyzing the effects of subsidies on firms´ general performances we observe that subsidies help 
exporters to improve efficiency, sales and employees while for domestic firms, subsidies only enhance 
efficiency and imports. 
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APPENDIX A – Average 1996 - 2003 
Sector 
code 
Sector Description Subsidies / Sales (%) Subsidies per 
employee 
15  Food, beverages   3.1  2870 
17 Textiles  0.6  250 
18 Wearing  apparel  1.1  263 
19 Leather  0.6  223 
20 Wood  0.7  338 
21  Pulp and paper  0.3  280 
22 Printing  2.2  652 
24 Chemicals  0.6  567 
25 Rubber,    plastic  0.4  285 
26  Non-metalic mineral product  0.8  307 
27 Basic  metals  0.3  191 
28  Fabricated metal products  0.5  230 
29 Machinery  0.6  256 
30 Office machinery and 
computers 
0.7 585 
31 Electrical  machinery  0.3  223 
32 TV  and  communication 
equipment 
0.5 330 
33  Medical, precision and optical 
instruments 
0.8 438 
34 Motor  vehicles  0.9  390 
35 Other  transport  equipment  1.2  802 
36 Furniture  4.4  302 
37 Recycling  11.2 
 
3204 
  Average 1.4 891 
  Source:  Own  calculations 
 




1998 22  160 
1999 17  261 
2000 14  172 
2001 11  125 
2002 15  114 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: firms without subsidies in each year: 677 
 
 
APPENDIX C – Treated and control firms for matching (Export share) GEE 
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 TREATED  CONTROL 
1998 108  478 
1999 132  491 
2000 78  478 
2001 75  482 
2002 78  483 
Source: Own calculations 
Note: firms without subsidies in each year: 677 
 




1998  R&D (+), Imports (+), 
1999  Imports (+), forcap (+) 
2000 Sectoral  dummies; 
2001  Sectoral dummies; Imports (+) 
2002  Sectoral dummies; forcap 
Source: Own calculations 
 
APPENDIX E – Average 1996 – 2003 
Sector 
code 






15  Food, beverages   0.002
+  -0.134
* 
17 Textiles  0.264
+  -0.178
* 
18 Wearing  apparel  -0.469
+ -0.078
+ 
19 Leather  -0.103
+ 0.249
+ 
20 Wood  -0.079
+ 0.275
+ 
21  Pulp and paper  -0.338
* -0.053
** 
22 Printing  0.029
+ -0.005
+ 
24 Chemicals  -0.082
+ -0.053
+ 
25 Rubber,    plastic  -0.782
+ -0.806
+ 
26  Non-metalic mineral product  0.151
+ -0.094
+ 
27 Basic  metals  0.147
+  0.211
* 
28  Fabricated metal products  -2.145
* -2.219
* 
29 Machinery  -0.262
+ 0.652
+ 
30  Office machinery and computers  n.a.  n.a. 
31 Electrical  machinery  0.902
* -0.153
+ 
32  TV, communication equipment  -0.015
+ -0,152
+ 
33  Medical, precision, optical instruments  -0.015
+ -0,152
+ 
34 Motor  vehicles  -7.841
+ -10.12
+ 
35 Other  transport  equipment  n.a.  n.a. 
36 Furniture  -1.65
+ 0.082
+ 
37 Recycling  n.a. n.a. 
  Source:  Own  calculations 
Note: statistically significant at 
*** 1%;
 ** 5%; 
* 10%
 